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Abstract
Using data for a large sample of countries, we find a robust economic and quan-
titatively significant positive relationship between new firm density and house price
volatility. A business cycle model with endogenous firm entry, housing, and housing
finance constraints successfully replicates this new fact, both qualitatively and quan-
titatively. Greater average firm entry is associated with higher average house prices.
This makes the cost of housing loans more sensitive to housing-finance shocks, lead-
ing to sharper credit and lending-spread fluctuations, and ultimately factually-sharper
house price fluctuations. We find broad empirical validation for this mechanism.
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1 Introduction
Economies that exhibit an above-average process of firm creation—a reflection of greater
firm and economic dynamism—tended to experience some of the greatest collapses in their
housing markets amid the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Well known examples are the
United Kingdom and Ireland where, from peak to trough, real house prices dropped by
roughly 30 percent and by over 80 percent, respectively. This backdrop raises two important
questions: is there a relationship between an economy’s firm dynamism and house price
volatility? If so, what are the economic characteristics and mechanisms that may explain this
relationship? Given the macroeconomic relevance of housing in many economies, identifying
the fundamental factors that drive the cyclical behavior of housing markets is critical.1
Using cross-country data on real house prices and new firm density (NFD) for a large
sample of countries with available high-frequency data on house prices, we find a robust
positive relationship between the average level of NFD (a proxy for firm dynamism) and
the volatility of real house prices (relative to GDP). This relationship is robust to a host
of control variables that may also contribute to explaining cross-country differences in the
volatility of housing markets. Moreover, this relationship is quantitatively important: our
benchmark results suggest that a 1 percent increase in average NFD can be associated with
up to a 0.6 percent increase in the average relative volatility of house prices.
To understand the economic mechanisms behind this new fact, we build a small open
economy (SOE) real business cycle (RBC) model with endogenous firm entry, housing, and
housing-finance constraints. We take the model to the data and show that our framework can
successfully generate the positive relationship between the relative volatility of house prices
and average NFD, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Moreover, our model-based anal-
ysis shows that financial shocks that affect housing finance markets—in the model, shocks
to borrowing households’ housing-based loan-to-value (LTV) ratios—are critical for quanti-
tatively generating an empirically-consistent link between house price volatility and average
NFD. While our empirical analysis cannot establish direct causality, the model does point
1See Iacoviello (2005); Iacoviello and Neri (2010); Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013); Gete (2015); Guerrrieri
and Uhlig, (2016); and Piazzesi and Schneider (2016), among others, for the importance of housing in
macroeconomics.
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to a non-negligible link from average firm entry to cyclical house market dynamics. This
result is novel and highlights an additional factor that contributes to a better understanding
of cross-country differences in house price dynamics.
Our framework features two household categories—entrepreneur and saver households.
In our baseline framework, entrepreneur households use internal resources to cover the sunk
entry costs of creating firms and face housing finance constraints whereby households borrow
from monopolistically-competitive banks to cover a portion of their housing-stock purchases.
As a baseline, saver households purchase housing without the need to borrow and supply
funds to entrepreneur households via the banking system. Firms use capital and labor
from both households to produce, and aggregate productivity and financial (housing-finance)
shocks drive business cycles. To analyze the link between NFD and house price volatility, we
generate increases in average (steady-state) new firm entry in the model over the NFD range
in our country sample by exogenously reducing firms’ sunk entry costs (this is consistent
with a strong and negative empirical relationship between the cost of opening a firm and
new firm density).
The economics behind our results is intuitive. A reduction in sunk entry costs bolsters
average (or steady-state) firm creation. Greater firm creation increases physical capital
and labor demand, and results in greater labor income and consumption for households, as
well as higher average output. The resulting rise in household income also leads to higher
average house prices, both in absolute terms and relative to income. Importantly, higher
average house prices makes housing purchases moore expensive in the economy, implying
that households now need larger average housing loans for a given amount of new housing.
Critically, this fact makes these households’ demand for housing credit more sensitive to
housing-finance shocks. The greater sensitivity of housing loans feeds into borrowing rates—
a component of households’ cost of house purchases—which in turn makes lending spreads
more sensitive to these shocks as well. The responsiveness of credit and lending spreads
to housing-finance shocks ultimately leads to greater house price volatility amid greater
average new firm entry. We provide empirical evidence on NFD, average house prices, and
the volatility of credit and lending spreads for our sample that provides strong support in
favor of this mechanism. Indeed, in our sample, greater average firm entry is, on average,
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associated with: (1) greater average real house prices (both in absolute terms and relative
to income); (2) greater volatility in bank credit; and (3) more volatile lending spreads.
This mechanism is also complemented by a secondary mechanism that works as follows.
A rise in firm entry implies greater competition and puts downward pressure on steady-
state individual-firm profits. With endogenous firm entry, both individual-firms and housing
represent assets to entrepreneur households. The view of firms as assets is a well-known
feature of macroeconomic models with endogenous firm entry rooted in the seminal work of
Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2012) (henceforth BGM). A reduction in individual-firm profits
makes the value of households’ assets, among which are firm-profits, more sensitive for a
given set of shocks. This sensitivity spills over into other assets in the economy, including
housing, thereby further contributing to more volatile house prices. We note, though, that
the first mechanism unambiguously dominates from a quantitative standpoint.
More broadly, our results suggest that greater average firm entry—which is partly a
reflection of an economy’s dynamism—represents a powerful amplification mechanism of
housing-finance shocks. The combination of housing finance constraints and these shocks
can rationalize the positive empirical link between NFD and house price volatility in the
data under a calibration with a parsimonious and plausible shock specification. Importantly,
we show that this empirical fact cannot be quantitatively explained by other relevant shocks,
such as housing demand shocks or shocks that reflect global liquidity movements, suggesting
that shocks that directly affect domestic housing finance markets are important for better
understanding differences in house price fluctuations across countries.
The relevance of housing price dynamics in aggregate fluctuations took center stage during
the GFC, with such relevance extending beyond the U.S. For example, existing work has
found that housing shocks in the U.S. can propagate to other economies (Cesa-Bianchi,
2013), and that housing price dynamics differ in advanced and emerging economies (Cesa-
Bianchi, Cespedes, and Rebucci, 2015).2 Recent work has also focused on the impact of
housing markets on entrepreneurship and firm creation in particular economies (Adelino,
2See Ng and Feng (2016) for the link between news shocks and housing price dynamics in small open
economies; Cesa-Bianchi, Ferrero, and Rebucci (2016), for work on the amplification role of housing prices
in response to capital inflows; and Kydland, Rupert, and Sˇustek (2016) for the relevance of the mortgage
structure for housing dynamics.
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Schoar, and Severino, 2015; Decker, 2015; Schott, 2015; Schmalz, Sraer, and Thesmar,
2017), as well as on the evolution of overall economic dynamism as reflected in firm startup
rates and firm creation (see Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda, 2014, for the U.S.;
and Calvino et al., 2015, for cross-country OECD evidence).
Our work contributes to existing empirical and theoretical work on cross-country dif-
ferences in housing market dynamics (Igan and Loungani, 2012; Hirata, Kose, Otrok, and
Terrones, 2012; Cesa-Bianchi, Cespedes, and Rebucci; 2015) and to the growing literature
on endogenous firm entry and macroeconomic dynamics.3 To the best of our knowledge, our
work is the first to present a business cycle model with endogenous firm entry in the spirit
of BGM with housing and housing finance constraints. Importantly, in contrast to studies
that have analyzed how housing and finance—in particular, how housing-based collateral fa-
cilitates credit access—affects firm formation (Adelino, Schoar, and Severino, 2015; Decker,
2015; Schott, 2015; Schmalz, Sraer, and Thesmar, 2017; among others), we focus on the op-
posite relationship: we study how differences in average firm formation across countries have
implications for housing market dynamics. All told, our work uncovers a novel factor that
further contributes to explaining cross-country differences in housing price volatility, and
provides a plausible and empirically-supported economic mechanism that can quantitatively
rationalize the cross-country link between firm dynamism and housing price dynamics.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents new evidence on average
new firm density and the volatility of housing prices. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4
presents our main findings and discusses the intuition behind our results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Analysis
This section presents evidence of a robust positive relationship between average new firm
density (NFD)—a proxy of firm dynamism—and the relative volatility of real house prices
(i.e., the ratio of the volatility of real house prices to the volatility of real GDP). Importantly,
we also characterize this relationship conditional on other factors that may contribute to the
3Hirata, Kose, Otrok, and Terrones (2012) focus primarily on housing cycle synchronization across coun-
tries, and the role of global financial and interest rate shocks, rather than on cross-country differences in
housing dynamics.
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cyclical variability of house prices to highlight the significance of this link.
2.1 Data in Baseline Analysis
Our country sample is based on data availability pertaining to our two main variables of
interest, real house prices and NFD. The countries in our sample are: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia,
Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, and United Kingdom. Time coverage varies
by country.4
NFD is obtained from the World Bank Entrepreneurship Report and is given by the
number of newly registered private corporations per 1000 individuals ages 15-64. NFD is
available at a yearly frequency from 2006 to 2016. We obtain average NFD by taking the
average of NFD over years 2006-2016 for each country.5
Real house prices are available at a quarterly frequency from the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) (period coverage varies by country). We construct the relative volatility
of real house prices by obtaining the cyclical components of real house prices and real GDP
for each country using an HP filter with smoothing parameter 1600, and then computing the
ratio of the standard deviation of the cyclical component of real house prices to the standard
deviation of the cyclical component of GDP. Our baseline analysis focuses on the period
2000Q1-2016Q4 (a compromise between having long-enough time series for house prices and
also accounting for the fact that NFD is only available starting in 2006), but we also explore
4Our measure of NFD is not available for the U.S. Moreover, Canada only has observations for 2015 and
2016 and as such is excluded from the sample used in our baseline specification. However, we note that
including Canada in our analysis does not change any of our main conclusions.
5The majority of countries in our sample have observations for all years. Only a very
small subset of countries has missing values for particular years. This, however, is not
an issue as we consider average NFD as our main measure of firm entry. The Ap-
pendix shows that using NFD in 2006 as our main measure of NFD does not change any
of our main findings. See http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/entrepreneurship and
http://econ.worldbank.org/research/entrepreneurship for more details on NFD.
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alternative sample periods (more on this below).
In addition to our main variables of interest, our baseline empirical analysis considers
a host of other country-specific variables that related literature highlights as relevant de-
terminants of house price volatility.6 Specifically, as a baseline, we consider the following
country-specific variables: the share of the population with a loan for a home purchase (Loan
for home Purchase); the average bank credit to the private sector-GDP ratio (Bank Credit-
GDP Ratio), the average quarterly inflation rate (Inflation Rate), the cyclical correlation
between global liquidity from banks and the country’s real GDP (Corr(Gl. Liquidity,GDP)),
and average household credit as a share of total (household and firm) credit (Household Credit
Share).7 We discuss how additional empirical specifications under alternative sets of con-
trols, different detrending techniques, and alternative time periods, among other robustness
checks, affect our main findings further below.
2.2 Empirical Specification and Baseline Results
To analyze the link between new firm density and real house price volatility, we run the
following cross-section OLS regression:
Qi = β0 + β1NFDi + β2Xi + εi,
where: Qi is the relative volatility of house prices in country i; NFDi is average new firm
density in country i; Xi is a vector of country-specific control variables; and εi is an error
term.
Table 1 presents our baseline results. The first row of this table implies that for the
average country, a 1 percent increase in average NFD is associated with an increase in the
relative volatility of house prices of between 0.12 percent and 0.62 percent, depending on the
specification.8
6The details for each of these variables is presented in the Data Appendix.
7All these variables are averaged over the relevant sample period based on data availability. Using total
global liquidity instead of global liquidity from banks does not change our main findings. See the Data
Appendix for more details.
8In our sample, average relative volatility of house prices is 2.42 and average NFD is 5.3. Increasing NFD
by 1 unit implies an 18 percent increase in NFD. Take, for instance, the coefficient in the 7th column of the
table. This 1 unit increase in NFD is associated with a 0.283 unit increase in relative volatility. For the
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Table 1: Relative Volatility of House Prices and New Firm Density (2000Q1-2016Q4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ave. New Firm Density 0.0901∗ 0.104∗ 0.124∗ 0.115∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗
(2.37) (2.49) (2.53) (2.43) (2.82) (2.75) (4.59)
Loan to Purchase Home -0.0132 -0.00206 0.00776 0.0214 0.0273 -0.0456
(-0.80) (-0.09) (0.36) (0.99) (1.14) (-1.43)
Bank Credit-GDP Ratio -0.00637 -0.00136 -0.00685 -0.00639 -0.00349
(-0.78) (-0.17) (-0.83) (-0.77) (-0.34)
Inflation Rate 0.742∗ 0.552 0.497 -0.0922
(2.26) (1.68) (1.44) (-0.21)
Corr(Gl. Liquidity,GDP) -1.911∗ -1.738+ -2.490∗
(-2.13) (-1.83) (-2.24)
Advanced Econ. -0.363
(-0.58)
Household Credit Share 4.174∗
(2.19)
Constant 1.958∗∗∗ 2.128∗∗∗ 2.355∗∗∗ 1.217+ 2.481∗∗ 2.540∗∗ 1.935
(6.85) (6.16) (5.21) (1.83) (2.84) (2.87) (1.41)
Adjusted R2 0.080 0.078 0.070 0.145 0.206 0.194 0.443
Observations 54 51 51 51 51 51 34
t statistics in parentheses
+p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
Sources: World Bank Global Financial Inclusion Database, World Bank Doing Business, World Bank World
Development Indicators, IMF International Financial Statistics, Bank of International Settlements. Notes:
The relative volatility of house prices for a given country is computed as the volatility of HP-filtered real
house prices divided by the volatility of HP-filtered real GDP for that country, using a smoothing parameter
of 1600. The cyclical correlation between global liquidity supplied by banks and real GDP is computed
as the contemporaneous correlation of HP-filtered global liquidity supplied by banks and HP-filtered real
GDP, using a smoothing parameter of 1600. The largest country sample is comprised of: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, and United Kingdom. See the Data
Appendix for details regarding data sources, country sample, and definitions.
Furthermore, Table 1 shows that even after controlling for a host of factors that may
influence the relative volatility of housing prices—including, among others, the share of
individuals in the economy that have housing loans, average inflation, the level of financial
development, and how global liquidity is cyclically correlated with a given country’s GDP,
average country, this represents an increase in relative volatility of roughly 12 percent.
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among others—greater average new firm density is still associated with a higher relative
volatility of house prices.9 Of note, the same results in Table 1 emerge if we consider absolute
instead of relative real housing price volatility (even after controlling for the volatility of
GDP). Thus, the positive relationship between relative house price volatility and average
NFD is not driven by cross-country differences in the volatility of GDP. Also, while not
shown, the link between housing price volatility and NFD in Table 1 continues to hold if
we exclude potential outliers from our country sample—in fact, the relationship becomes
stronger. Thus, our findings are not driven by countries that may have extreme values for
relative house price volatility or average NFD.
2.3 Robustness and Caveats
Of course, other factors beyond the ones in Table 1 may influence the volatility of house
prices. We briefly discuss how the findings in Table 1 are robust to alternative and ad-
ditional controls, alternative sample periods and house price series, and different filtering
methodologies.
Alternative Sample Periods Our baseline specification focuses on the period 2000Q1-
2016Q4. The Appendix shows similar findings for the period 2006Q1-2016Q4, which is an
important robustness check given that the series on NFD starts in 2006 (see Table A1), and
1990Q1-2016Q4, which we consider for completeness given that a handful of countries in our
sample have house price data going back to the 1990s (see Table A2). In addition, Table A3
in the Appendix performs the same analysis as the one in Table 1 using NFD in year 2006
(and not average NFD from 2006 to 2016) as the measure of firm dynamism. The results
from Table 1 remain, with the estimated coefficients for NFD being somewhat larger and
statistically stronger.
Additional and Alternative Controls Our results are also robust to controlling for the
cyclical volatility of inflation as well as average population growth, both of which may affect
9The household credit share—that is, the share of total credit that corresponds to credit towards
households—is only available for a limited set of countries. Hence the smaller number of observations
when we control for the household credit share.
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the cyclical variability of house prices (see Table A4 in the Appendix). Also, we note that
all results continue to hold if we replace the average bank credit-GDP ratio with average
real GDP per capita (results available upon request), suggesting that differences in economic
development cannot explain the NFD-house price volatility nexus.
One non-trivial limitation of our data is that NFD only considers registered private
corporations. This implies that (1) NFD may be underestimated in economies with a non-
negligible informal sector (that is, economies where unregistered (both new and old) firms
tend to be more prevalent), and (2) NFD may be capturing firms who had already entered
the market and simply became formal by registering. We consider NFD as our main measure
of firm dynamism since it is comparable across countries and, in contrast to other measures
of firm dynamism, it is available for virtually all countries with available data on house
prices. To address the potential shortcomings of the NFD measure, though, Table A4 in the
Appendix shows that our main empirical findings are robust to controlling for the share of
own-account-workers—a proxy for owner-only firms, which are more likely than not to be
unregistered—and the size of the informal sector (as a percent of GDP). Both of these mea-
sures capture, in different ways, the prevalence of unregistered (or informal) firms already in
the market or the size of the unregistered-firm market. Also, we note that, while comparable
cross-country data on firm startup rates is limited to only a small handful of countries, using
the firm startup rate measure from Calvino et al. (2015) for 14 economies with available
data as an alternative to NFD confirms a positive and strong relationship between house
price volatility and firm startup rates.10 Thus, the main facts in Table 1 are similar amid
alternative measures of firm dynamism, despite the fact that these alternative measures are
available for a limited set of countries.
Alternative Filtering Methodologies and Housing Price Series As an additional
robustness check, we perform the same analysis presented in Table 1 using real house price
and GDP series in first differences (see Table A5 in the Appendix for the results). In addition,
we perform the same anlysis using the dataset on quarterly real housing prices from Cesa-
10Regressing relative house price volatility on the startup rate yields a coefficient of 0.08 (significant at
the 5 percent level and, importantly, quantitatively similar to the results in Table 1 under a larger country
sample and a different measure of firm dynamism). Controlling for other factors that may affect house price
volatility does not change these results.
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Bianchi et al. (2015), which goes back to 1990Q1 for a similar though not identical country
sample. The findings with this alternative series are the same as those in Table 1 (see Table
A6 in the Appendix).11
All told, our main results are robust to alternative sample periods for the volatility of
house prices, different filtering methodologies, as well as the inclusion of other factors that
may explain differences in housing price dynamics across countries.
In what follows, we present a tractable model that sheds light on the economic mech-
anisms behind the positive relationship between firm dynamism and relative house price
volatility in Table 1.
3 The Model
Our baseline framework is a SOE RBCmodel comprised of perfectly-competitive intermediate-
goods firms who produce using capital and labor, monopolistically-competitive final goods
firms whose entry is endogenous, a monopolistically-competitive banking system, and two
household categories. The total housing stock in the economy is fixed and normalized to
1. Households are divided into two categories—savers (s) and entrepreneurs (e). Each
household derives utility from consumption, leisure, and housing.
Saver (s) households consume, purchase housing, and supply labor to intermediate-goods
firms; they own banks and supply deposits to the domestic banking system. In the baseline
model, s households do not borrow to purchase new housing (we relax this assumption,
which we show to be innocuous for our main conclusions, as part of our robustness analysis).
Entrepreneur (e) households own all firms. They consume, purchase housing, supply labor
to intermediate-goods firms, accumulate capital, and borrow from abroad. Importantly, in
contrast to s households, e households devote resources to the creation of (final goods) firms
in the spirit of BGM. They also borrow from banks to finance the purchase of new housing.
11Real house price data from Cesa-Bianchi, Cespedes, and Rebucci (2015), is available at a quarterly
frequency from 1990Q1 to 2012Q4 for: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary,
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia,
Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia,
Serbia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United
Kingdom (sample period varies by country).
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We follow Kydland et al. (2016) and assume that e households face a financing constraint
such that a fraction of new housing purchased in the current period is financed with bank
credit. Banks are monopolistically-competitive, which gives rise to a lending-deposit spread
for housing loans. Finally, as a baseline, business cycles are driven by aggregate productivity
shocks and housing-finance (or financial) shocks that affect e households’ housing finance
constraint.12
Each of the elements in our model is relevant in the context of our main question. Having
endogenous firm entry in the model is key to exploring the link between firm entry (our
proxy for NFD) and house price dynamics. The presence of housing finance constraints
is standard in RBC models of housing. In turn, assuming a monopolistically-competitive
banking system has two purposes. First, amid homogeneity in household discounting among
e and s households, such banking structure introduces lending-deposit spreads and allows e
households’ financing constraints (and shocks) to have a bite. Second, this banking structure
readily allows us to determine the extent to which household differences in housing finance
affects the link between NFD and house price volatility without the need for a more complex
environment that requires additional household heterogeneity.13
There are two differences between our framework and related models where entrepreneurs
hold housing (see, for example, Iacoviello, 2015). First, in our model, housing is simply an
element in both households’ utility function and is not used in the production process.
Second, we assume that the financing constraint for e households is such that a fraction
of current-period housing purchases is partially financed with bank credit; this differs from
the general-borrowing specification whereby household borrowing is based on the expected
value of households’ housing stock. The first assumption stems primarily from the data
we use for the stylized facts in Section 2. In particular, our house price data is based on
residential and not commercial property prices. Moreover, our data on new firm density
refers to registered firms. As such, the likelihood that entrepreneur households are using
12We explore other shocks, including housing demand and foreign interest rate shocks, as part of our
robustness analysis.
13The SOE assumption follows existing theoretical work on cross-country differences in housing market
dynamics. Global liquidity has been shown to play a role in cross-country house price dynamics (Cesa-
Bianchi, Cespedes, and Rebucci, 2015; Cesa-Bianchi, Ferrero, and Rebucci, 2016, 2017), and having a SOE
allows us to account, in a reduced-form way, for these factors once foreign interest rate shocks are introduced
in the model, which we do as part of our sensitivity analysis.
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their residential properties to produce is much less likely relative to unregistered firms,
many of which are family and household-based firms. The second assumption is consistent
with cross-country evidence showing that mortgage credit is one of the largest components
of total household credit in many economies (Beck et al., 2012). The structure of housing
finance we adopt is therefore consistent with the cross-country focus in Section 2.
3.1 Final Goods Firms
Following the endogenous entry framework in BGM, there is a continuum of monopolistically-
competitive firms. These firms are owned by entrepreneur (e) households. Each firm pro-
duces a single differentiated final good ω ∈ Ω using inputs from intermediate-goods firms,
where Ω denotes the subset of differentiated goods that are potentially available (as is stan-
dard in the literature, only a fraction of these goods end up being produced). Total final
output is given by
Yt =
(∫
ω∈Ω
yt(ω)
ε−1
ε dω
) ε
ε−1
,
where ε is the elasticity of substitution and yt(ω) is output produced by firm ω. Then, the
price index in the economy is given by Pt =
(∫
ω∈Ω
pt(ω)
1−εdω
) 1
1−ε where pt(ω) is firm ω’s
price. Then, the real relative price for a given good ω is given by ρt(ω) = pt(ω)/Pt.
Incumbent Firms Profits for incumbent firm ω are given by pie,t(ω) = [ρt(ω)−mct] yt(ω),
where mct denotes the price of intermediate goods used in production by final goods firms.
Firms face an exogenous exit probability 0 < δ < 1 at the end of each period. Thus, firm
ω maximizes Et
∑∞
s=t Ξ
e
s|t[(1− δ)
s−tpie,s(ω)] subject to households’ demand, where Ξ
e
s|t is the
discount factor used by firms to discount the future (i.e., e households’ stochastic discount
factor). The first-order conditions yield a standard pricing equation under monopolistic
competition: ρt(ωj) = (ε/(ε− 1))mct.
Firm Entry Amid an unbounded number of potential entrants, let Nt be the mass of
incumbent (producing) firms in period t. Following the literature, there is a one-period pro-
duction lag for new entrants NE,t in period t. After accounting for the exogenous probability
of exit δ, it follows that the current mass of firms is Nt = (1− δ) (Nt−1 +NE,t−1) . Potential
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new firms must incur an exogenous sunk entry cost ψe (expressed in terms of final goods).
This cost can represent the technological and resource costs of entering a market, but also
the regulatory costs that firms face in order to become established in that market (see Cac-
ciatore, Duval, Fiori, and Ghironi, 2016a,b). Given our focus on cross-country differences
in new firm density, we assume that this cost is exogenous and we vary it to explore the
implications of firm entry for house price volatility.
Potential firms considering entry in period t anticipate their future profits once they
enter the market such that the present discounted value of expected profits obtained once
production takes place (i.e., in period t + 1 and beyond) is vt(ω) = Et
∑∞
s=t+1 Ξ
e
s|t(1 −
δ)s−tpie,s(ω). As shown in e households’ problem below, in equilibrium and after imposing
symmetry across firms, the entry decision is characterized by vt(ω) = vt = ψe/(1 − δ). Of
note, since our framework assumes a fixed population in the economy, NE,t is the model
counterpart of new firm density in the data.
3.2 Intermediate Goods Firms
Perfectly-competitive intermediate-goods firms rent capital from e households at price rk,t
and use (perfectly-substitutable) labor from both household categories to produce goods
using a Cobb-Douglas production function. These goods are then supplied as inputs to
differentiated final goods firms. Specifically, intermediate-goods firms choose capital demand
kt and labor demand nt to maximize profits Πi,t =
[
mctztn
1−α
t k
α
t − wtnt − rk,tkt
]
, where
mct is the price of intermediate goods, z is exogenous aggregate productivity, 0 < α < 1,
and rk,t and wt represent the real rental rate of capital and the real wage, respectively.
Optimal capital and labor demand are standard and given by rk,t = αmctztn
1−α
t k
α−1
t and
wt = (1− α)mctztn
−α
t k
α
t , respectively.
3.3 Households
Saver (s) Households There is a continuum of identical saver (s) households over the
interval [0, 1]. They choose consumption cs,t, housing demand hs,t, bank deposits dt, and
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labor supply ns,t to maximize E0
∑∞
t=0 β
tu(cs,t, ns,t, hs,t) subject to the budget constraint
cs,t +Qh,t(hs,t − hs,t−1) + dt = wtns,t +Rt−1dt−1 +Πb,t, (1)
where β is the subjective discount factor, Qh,t is the real price of housing, wt is the real
wage, Rt is the gross real interest rate on deposits, and Πb,t =
∫ 1
0
pijb,tdj denotes total
bank profits (defined below). Households have GHH preferences over consumption and
labor: u(cs,t, ns,t, hs,t) =
[
1
1−σ
(
cs,t −
κ
1+ξ
n1+ξs,t
)1−σ
+ γh
1−σh
(hs,t)
1−σh
]
with σ, σh, κ, ξ, γ > 0.
We adopt GHH preferences since there is a positive and significant relationship between
NFD and (population-adjusted) total hours worked in our country sample.14 The first-order
conditions yield standard optimal labor supply and housing demand expressions
κnξs,t = wt, (2)
and
Qh,t = γh
(hs,t)
−σh
ucs,t
+ EtΞ
s
t+1|tQh,t+1, (3)
as well as a standard Euler equation over deposits
ucs,t = βRtEtucs,t+1, (4)
where Ξst+1|t ≡ βucs,t+1/ucs,t . The economic intuition behind these conditions is standard,
with households equating the marginal cost of working to the marginal benefit, the marginal
cost of purchasing an additional unit of housing Qh,t to the expected marginal benefit, and
the marginal cost of saving one more unit of resources to the expected marginal benefit.
Entrepreneur (e) Households: Utility Maximization and Firm Creation There
is a continuum of identical entrepreneur (e) households indexed by i over the interval [0, 1].
14The correlation between average new firm density and total hours worked is 0.32 and significant at
the 5 percent level. Importantly, this relationship holds even after controlling for the size of the informal
sector, which is important as the informal sector is non-negligible in several economies in our sample and
can therefore affect the link between NFD and labor. Standard preferences in the business cycle literature
that allow for a wealth effect on labor supply deliver no change in hours worked amid changes in firm entry,
which is counterfactual in our data.
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These households own all firms and, in contrast to s households, invest in the creation
of new final-goods firms by incurring sunk entry costs for the creation of these firms. In
addition, e households obtain differentiated loans from banks to finance the purchase of
new housing.15 Specifically, e households choose consumption ce,t, housing demand he,t,
labor supply ne,t, capital accumulation kt, total borrowed funds le,t, the number of new
final-goods firms NE,t, and the desired number of future final-goods firms Nt+1 to maximize
E0
∑∞
t=0 β
tu(ce,t, ne,t, he,t) subject to the budget constraint
16
ce,t + kt + ψeNE,t +Qh,t(he,t − he,t−1) +Re,t−1le,t−1 +R
∗
t−1b
∗
t−1 +
ηb
2
(b∗t )
2
= wtne,t + b
∗
t +Ntpie,t +Πi,t + le,t + (1− δ)kt−1 + rk,tkt−1,
the evolution of final goods firms
Nt+1 = (1− δ) (Nt +NE,t) , (5)
and the housing finance constraint
le,t = φh,tQh,the,t, (6)
where 0 < δ < 1 is the depreciation rate of capital as well as the exogenous exit prob-
ability of firms.17 Preferences over consumption and labor are also of the GHH form:
u(ce,t, ne,t, he,t) =
[
1
1−σ
(
ce,t −
κ
1+ξ
n1+ξe,t
)1−σ
+ γh
1−σh
(he,t)
1−σh
]
with σ, σh, κ, ξ, γ > 0. The
household takes profits from final goods firms and intermediate-goods firms as well as all
relevant prices as given. In the budget constraint, Re,t is the average real gross rate at which
households borrow, R∗ is the real gross foreign interest rate, and households face a convex
15The Appendix presents a richer version of the model where both households use bank credit to finance
new housing purchases. Similarly, the Appendix also presents a version of the model where the sunk entry
costs and a fraction of intermediate-goods firms’ wage and capital bills are financed with bank credit. We
discuss the results from these richer frameworks further below.
16We include standard capital adjustment costs as part of our quantitative analysis in order to obtain a
reasonable degree of investment volatility. We abstract from these costs in the description of the model for
expositional clarity.
17Assuming differences between the depreciation rate of physical capital and the exit probability of firms
does not change any of our conclusions.
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cost of adjusting foreign debt holdings whereby ηb > 0 induces stationarity.
18 The financing
constraint follows Kydland et al. (2016) and specifies that households’ borrowed funds for
housing purchases are a fraction φh,t of households’ current-period new housing purchases,
where φh,t can be interpreted as the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. We assume that φh,t is
time-varying and subject to shocks, which we refer to as housing-finance or LTV shocks (for
similar shocks in the literature, see, for example, Iacoviello, 2015).
Plugging the housing finance constraint into the budget constraint, we obtain standard
Euler equations for capital and foreign debt
1 = EtΞ
e
t+1|t [rk,t+1 + 1− δ] , (7)
and
1 = R∗tEtΞ
e
t+1|t + ηbb
∗
t , (8)
where Ξet+1|t ≡ βuce,t+1/uce,t is the household’s stochastic discount factor; a standard labor
supply condition
κnξe,t = wt, (9)
an optimal firm creation condition
vt = EtΞ
e
t+1|t [pie,t+1 + (1− δ) vt+1] , (10)
where vt denotes the value of creating a new firm and is given by
vt =
ψe
(1− δ)
, (11)
and an optimal housing demand condition that takes into account households’ housing fi-
nance constraint
Qh,t =
(he,t)
−σh
uce,t
+ EtΞ
e
t+1|tQh,t+1 −Qh,tφh,t
[
EtΞ
e
t+1|tRe,t − 1
]
. (12)
18This is a standard assumption in SOE models. Alternative formulations of this adjustment cost, such as
those that are only operative amid shocks (see, for example, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2003) do not change
any of our conclusions.
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Intuitively, e households equate the marginal cost of spending resources on the creation
of an additional firm (adjusted for the probability of firm survival), vt, to the expected
marginal benefit of having an additional firm, given by future individual-firm profits and the
continuation value. Of note, the firm creation condition effectively implies that households
consider firms as an additional asset (in addition to housing, physical capital, and foreign
debt holdings), which is a well-known feature of BGM models of endogenous firm entry.
Finally, households equate the marginal cost of purchasing an additional unit of housing,
Qh,t, to the expected marginal benefit, which is given by the utility gain from housing and any
expected capital gains from housing appreciation, EtΞ
e
t+1|tQh,t+1, net of any costs that arise
from borrowing for new housing purchases, where
[
EtΞ
e
t+1|tRe,t − 1
]
represents the expected
lending spread. Of note, the fact that the banking sector is monopolistically competitive and
that s households own the banks implies that this spread will be positive, both in steady
state and over the business cycle, even if both s and e households have the same subjective
discount factor.
Entrepreneur (e) Households: Borrowing Cost-Minimization Amid monopolistic
competition in the banking sector, each e household i chooses differentiated borrowed funds
from each bank j. Specifically, denote by lie,t =
(∫ 1
0
l
εh−1
εh
ije,t dj
) εh
εh−1
the amount of borrowed
funds e household i has, where εh is the elasticity of substitution between bank resources
and le,t =
∫ 1
0
lie,tdi. Then, each e household i chooses lije,t to minimize the total cost of
borrowed funds
∫ 1
0
Rje,tlije,tdj subject to lie,t =
(∫ 1
0
l
εh−1
εh
ije,t dj
) εh
εh−1
, where Rje,t is taken as given
and Re,t =
(∫ 1
0
R1−εhje,t dj
) 1
1−εh . The solution to this problem yields a standard demand for
differentiated borrowed funds from bank j: lije,t =
(
Rje,t
Re,t
)−εh
lie,t. At the e-household level,
then, the demand for borrowed funds from bank j is simply lje,t =
∫ 1
0
lije,tdi =
∫ 1
0
(
Rje,t
Re,t
)−εh
lie,tdi.
3.4 Banks
The banking sector has a measure [0, 1] of banks. Banks are monopolistically competitive in
the market for loans but perfectly competitive in the market for deposits. They turn all their
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profits to s households. Each bank j chooses its gross real loan rate Rje,t to maximize profits
pijb,t = Rje,tlje,t−Rtdj,t− lje,t− djt subject to the balance sheet constraint lje,t = djt and the
bank’s loan demand condition from e households (derived above). Then, the optimal loan
rate for bank j is a standard (constant) markup over the deposit rate Rje,t = (εh/(εh − 1))Rt.
3.5 Symmetric Equilibrium and Market Clearing
Symmetry across firms and banks implies that Yt = ytN
ε
ε−1
t and Re,t = (εh/(εh − 1))Rt.
Market clearing in the credit, labor, and goods markets implies that dt = le,t, ne,t+ns,t = nt,
and ztn
1−α
t k
a
t = Ntyt. Since the total housing stock is normalized to 1, market clearing in
the housing market is given by he,t + hs,t = 1. Moreover, the economy’s resource constraint
is
Yt = cs,t + ce,t + it + ψeNE,t +R
∗
t−1b
∗
t−1 − b
∗
t , (13)
where physical capital investment it = kt− (1−δ)kt−1. Section A.5 of the Appendix presents
the full set of equilibrium conditions.
As noted in BGM, when comparing the model to the data, variables expressed in final
consumption goods need to be adjusted to account for CPI measurements when it comes to
the variety component present in models with endogenous entry (which arise with preferences
that have a ”love for variety” component). As such, if variable xm,t in the model is expressed
in final consumption units, its empirical counterpart is xd,t = xm,t/ρt (see BGM for more
details).
4 Quantitative Analysis
4.1 Operationalization
Parameters from Literature and Shocks A period is a quarter. Following the business
cycle literature, we set α = 0.32, β = 0.985, δ = 0.025, σ = 2, σh = 2, all of which are standard
values. We set the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply to 0.75, as suggested by Chetty
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et al. (2011). This implies that ξ = 1.33.19 R∗ is set to 1.009, which is consistent with
the real gross return on U.S. 3-month Treasury bills for our sample period. We set the
steady-state LTV ratio ψh = 0.80 based on evidence on average LTV ratios in our country
sample. We introduce standard capital adjustment costs using the function Φ(kt/kt−1) =
(ϕk/2)(kt/kt−1 − 1)
2kt, ϕk > 0, and assume independent AR(1) processes in logs for all
shocks: ln(xt) = (1 − ρx) ln(x) + ρx ln(xt−1) + ε
x
t , where 0 < ρx < 1 and ε
x
t ˜N(0, σx) for
x = z, φh. As a baseline, we set ρx = 0.90 for x = z, φh.
20 Without loss of generality, we
normalize aggregate productivity to z = 1 and set σz = 0.01.
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Calibrated Parameters The parameters κ, ψe, ηb, γh, φk, and εh are chosen to match: a
total time allocation to work of 0.33 (a standard target in the business cycle models), a
steady-state measure of new firms NE of 0.09 (consistent with the lowest country-average
NFD in our country sample), a household credit-GDP ratio of 33 percent and a foreign
debt-GDP ratio of 60 percent (consistent with the 2000-2016 averages in our country sample
with available data), a relative volatility of investment of 3.8 percent (consistent with the
average relative volatility of investment in our country sample) and an average quarterly
lending-deposit rate of 1 percent (consistent with evidence on average spreads over 2000-
2016 in our country sample).22 This yields: κ = 21.9289, ψe = 1.338, ηb = 0.0088, γh =
0.0503, φk = 0.4125, and εh = 102.5228. Of note, this calibration also delivers plausible
housing wealth-income ratios broadly in line with the literature.
Calibration of Housing-Finance Shocks Finally, we calibrate the volatility of housing-
finance shocks as follows. Klapper and Love (2010) document that the cost of starting
a business is an important determinant of NFD. Figure A1 in the Appendix confirms a
strong and significant negative relationship between different measures of the average cost
of starting a business and average NFD for the period for which data on new firm density is
19Alternative values such as ξ = 1, which are more standard in the macro literature, make our main results
stronger.
20This is consistent with the values adopted in models with housing-based LTV shocks.
21We discuss the consequences of introducing foreign interest rate shocks and housing demand shocks
further below. Results with these shocks are presented in the Appendix and confirm that our main conclusions
remain unchanged.
22We find no significant relationship between lending-deposit spreads and NFD in our data, implying that
these spreads do not change with NFD.
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available (2006-2016). Recall that since population in our model is fixed, NFD in our model
corresponds to NE .
In light of these facts and given our focus on the relationship between NFD and housing
price volatility, we change ψe in the model—which is the model-counterpart of the cost of
starting a firm—to generate a change in steady-state NE from 0.09—the lowest average NFD
in our country sample—to roughly 25, which corresponds to the highest average NFD in our
country sample.23 The change in ψe (and hence steady-state NE) generates endogenous
changes in the steady state and cyclical behavior of other variables, including house prices,
amid aggregate productivity and housing-finance shocks in the model. Specifically, this
exercise yields a cross-section of steady-state NE and the relative volatility of house prices
(that is, the volatility of housing prices relative to the volatility of output) associated with
each value of steady-state NE in the range outlined above. We then calibrate the volatility of
housing-finance shocks such that regressing the model-generated relative volatility of house
prices on model-generated steady-state NE delivers the same intercept as in the data-based
regression of relative housing price volatility on average NFD. Importantly, we stress that this
calibration strategy does not imply that the model-generated slope will match the data-based
slope by construction; while the data-based and model-based trend lines do have the same
intercept, the model-generated slope is endogenous as new firm density changes.. All told,
this yields σφh = 0.0343. More broadly, this strategy is appropriate when comparing the
average effect of changes in NFD on the volatility of house prices in the model to the data,
as we do below, which is consistent with the fact that our empirical experiments in Section 2
indeed show the average effect of changes in (cross-country) average NFD on (cross-country)
house price volatility.
4.2 New Firm Density and House Price Volatility: Data vs. Model
Figure 1 plots the relationship between average NFD and the relative volatility of house
prices in the data against the model-generated (endogenous) relationship between these
two variables that comes from varying the sunk cost of entry, as described above. Once
again, as noted in the description of the calibration, the model-based and empirical-based
23In the benchmark calibration, this implies a reduction in the sunk entry cost ψe from 1.3122 to 0.087.
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regression lines have the same intercept by construction, but the slope—which provides a
graphical representation of the extent to which the model can quantitatively capture the cross-
country relationship between new firm density and housing price volatility in the data—is an
endogenous outcome in the model. Under the benchmark calibration, the model successfully
replicates the positive relationship between average NFD and housing price volatility in the
data exceedingly well.24
Figure 1: Average New Firm Density and Housing Price Volatility: Data vs. Model
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In what follows, we discuss the economic mechanisms that allow the model to replicate
this relationship. As we illustrate further below, housing-finance shocks play a key role in
quantitatively replicating the empirical link between NFD and house price volatility.
24As we discuss further below, the Appendix shows that: (1) allowing all households to borrow to finance
new housing purchases or (2) allowing e households to also finance a portion of sunk entry costs as well as
intermediate-goods-firms’ wage and capital bills with bank credit does not change our main findings.
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4.3 Economic Mechanisms
4.3.1 Steady State
First consider how the steady state changes as we reduce ψe, which in turn increases steady-
state firm entry NE (or NFD). Intuitively, e households have the choice of allocating resources
across several asset classes: housing (via the purchase of new housing), firms (via investment
in new firms), physical capital, and foreign assets (via the purchase of foreign debt). For
the sake of transparency, focus on the first two asset classes. As the sunk entry cost falls,
the marginal cost of creating a new firm falls, which increases e households’ incentive to
reallocate resources towards firm creation and therefore away from new housing. The fall
in housing demand from these households initially puts downward pressure on the price of
housing. In turn, this downward pressure pushes s households to increase their housing
demand. Importantly, in equilibrium, the greater demand by s households dominates the
fall in demand by e households, resulting in a non-negligible and unambiguous increase in
equilibrium steady-state housing prices. Of note, the rise in steady-state house prices occurs
not only in absolute terms, but also relative to income. In addition, the resulting reallocation
of resources towards firm creation eventually results in greater capital accumulation and labor
demand among intermediate-goods firms, while the rise in firm entry depresses individual-
firm profits pie. However, both households’ labor income and e households’ total income from
ownership of final goods firms (Npie) rise, which ultimately leads to higher consumption
across households, as well as higher equilibrium total consumption and output. All told,
economies with greater average (or steady-state) firm entry exhibit: higher steady-state house
prices, investment, consumption, output, labor income, and lower individual-firm profits. At
the same time, the resulting rise in house prices implies that the steady-state size of housing
loans, le = ψhQh ∗ he. These results are summarized in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Steady State Results–New Firm Entry and Select Variables in Benchmark Model
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4.3.2 Effect of NFD on Cyclical Dynamics
To better understand how endogenous firm entry acts as an amplification mechanism of
house-market-based financial shocks in our model, consider e households’ housing finance
constraint, le,t = φh,tQh,the,t, once again. In particular, it is easy to see that for a given
housing stock held by e households, the higher steady-state house price in economies with
greater steady-state firm entry naturally implies that the housing loan size that e households
need to purchase new housing (le) is higher.
25 Critically, this also implies that all else equal
the sensitivity of housing loans to a given set of housing-finance shocks is greater in these
economies. Since in equilibrium the amount of deposits d is equal to housing loans le, the
greater response of le to housing-finance shocks ultimately translates into a greater response
in borrowing rates Re.
26 Importantly, it is not greater average house prices by themselves that
are critical, but rather their implications for the sensitivity of housing loans and borrowing
25As noted earlier, greater firm entry reduces the equilibrium housing stock holdings by e households.
However, from a quantitative standpoint, this reduction is more than offset by the rise in steady-state house
prices.
26This result would still hold in an environment where only a fraction of deposits is lent out, as existing
regulations in many economies require.
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rates (which ultimately affect lending spreads) to housing-finance shocks. In addition to this
effect, the fact that steady-state individual-firm profits pie are lower amid greater firm entry
also implies that such profits become more sensitive to shocks.
To formally see how these two effects have implications for housing price dynamics in our
framework, first consider e households’ optimal firm creation condition in log-linear form:
vˆt =
(pie
v
)
ΞeEt
[
Ξ̂et+1|t + pˆie,t+1
]
+ ΞeEt
[
Ξ̂et+1|t + vˆt+1
]
. (14)
where hatted variables denote variables in log-deviations from steady-state and variables
without time subscripts denote these same variables in steady state. Solving for ΞeEtΞ̂
e
t+1|t,
we can write
ΞeEtΞ̂
e
t+1|t =
[
v
v + pie
]
[vˆt − Ξ
e
Etvˆt+1]−
[
pie
v + pie
]
ΞeEtpˆie,t+1. (15)
Moreover, recall that the equilibrium value of a new firm is given by vt = ψe/(1 − δ). If ψe
and δ are time-invariant (which they are in our benchmark model), v = ψe/(1 − δ) and in
equilibrium vˆt = 0 for all t.
27 Furthermore, in steady state, the firm creation condition delivers
a clear link between the sunk entry cost ψe and individual firm profits pie: ψe [1− (1− δ)β] =
(1− δ)βpie. Taken together, these facts imply that the above expression collapses to
EtΞ̂
e
t+1|t = −
[
[1− (1− δ)β]
β + [1− (1− δ)β]
]
Etpˆie,t+1. (16)
Now, consider both households’ housing demand conditions
Qh,t =
uhs,t
ucs,t
+ EtΞ
s
t+1|tQh,t+1, (17)
and
Qh,t =
uhe,t
uce,t
+ EtΞ
e
t+1|tQh,t+1 −Qh,tφh,t
[
EtΞ
e
t+1|tRe,t − 1
]
. (18)
where uhj,t denotes the marginal utility of housing for household j ∈ {e, s}. The log-linear
27Allowing ψe to be time-varying (say, a function of the real wage and aggregate productivity, as in BGM)
does not change our main conclusions or the general intuition below.
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versions of these expressions can be expressed as
ΞsQhEtQ̂h,t+1 = QhQ̂h,t −
uhs
ucs
[
ûhs,t − ûcs,t
]
− ΞsQhEtΞ̂
s
t+1|t, (19)
and
ΞeQhEtQ̂h,t+1 = [1− φh (1− Ξ
eRe)]QhQ̂h,t −
uhe
uce
[
ûhe,t − ûce,t
]
(20)
−QhΞ
e [1− φhRe]EtΞ̂
e
t+1|t +QhφhΞ
eReEtR̂e,t −Qhφh [1− Ξ
eRe] φ̂h,t.
Noting that Ξe = Ξs = β, we can use both expressions to solve for Q̂h,t :
Q̂h,t =
(
1
φhQh (1− ΞeRe)
)[
uhs
ucs
(
ûhs,t − ûcs,t
)
−
uhe
uce
(
ûhe,t − ûce,t
)]
(21)
+
Ξs
φh (1− ΞeRe)
EtΞ̂
s
t+1|t −
Ξe [1− φhRe]
φh (1− ΞeRe)
EtΞ̂
e
t+1|t +
ΞeRe
(1− ΞeRe)
EtR̂e,t − φ̂h,t.
Finally, inserting the expression for EtΞ̂
e
t+1|t obtained earlier into this last condition yields an
explicit expression for Q̂h,t as a function of key variables related to firm entry and housing
finance:
Q̂h,t = Φ1
[
uhs
ucs
(
ûhs,t − ûcs,t
)
−
uhe
uce
(
ûhe,t − ûce,t
)]
+ Φ2EtΞ̂
s
t+1|t (22)
+Φ3Etpˆie,t+1 + Φ4EtR̂e,t − φ̂h,t.
where Φ1 ≡
(
1
φhQh(1−ΞeRe)
)
< 0, Φ2 ≡
Ξs
φh(1−ΞeRe)
< 0, Φ3 ≡
Ξe[1−φhRe]
φh(1−ΞeRe)
[
[1−(1−δ)β]
β+[1−(1−δ)β]
]
< 0,
and Φ4 ≡
ΞeRe
(1−ΞeRe)
< 0. We note that in our baseline calibration, Φ3 < Φ4, so fluctuations in
the borrowing rate (and ultimately the lending spread) have a larger impact on house price
fluctuations relative to movements in firm profits.28
The last expression above shows that, all else equal, greater steady-state deviations in
borrowing rates (or lending spreads) and individual-firm profits—both of which are more
volatile when average firm entry is higher—contribute to greater steady-state deviations in
house prices. In turn, this implies greater fluctuations in house prices in absolute terms and
28This is also the case under other plausible parameterizations of the model.
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relative to fluctuations in output. While both greater volatility in (expected) individual-
firm profits and borrowing rates translates into greater house price volatility, the rise in the
volatility of borrowing rates amid higher average firm entry dominates and is responsible
for quantitatively explaining the sharper fluctuations in house prices. This suggests that
housing finance constraints—and, as shown below, the shocks affecting housing finance—are
critical for explaining the positive connection between average new firm density (i.e. new
firm entry) and house price fluctuations.
4.3.3 Economic Intuition
The channel through which this occurs in the model is intuitive: by boosting household
income, economies with higher average firm entry exhibit higher average (or steady state)
house prices (both in absolute terms and relative to income). In the presence of housing
finance constraints, this implies that the average (or steady-state) loan size is greater for a
given amount of housing. Having a greater average loan size makes households’ decisions over
housing loans more sensitive to housing-finance (or LTV) shocks. The greater sensitivity of
borrowed funds to these shocks translates into more volatile borrowing rates (and, ultimately,
more volatile lending spreads) and hence more volatile costs associated with the purchase of
new housing. Coupled with the higher volatility in firm profits (which embody the value of
firms) that results from greater average firm entry, the volatility in housing-related borrowing
rates and spreads ultimately contributes to more volatile asset prices, including house prices.
Figure 3 compares the response to a positive housing-finance (or LTV) shock in the model
under the baseline calibration to the response in an otherwise identical economy where, for
illustrative purposes, the sunk entry cost is only half of the one in the benchmark economy
(this implies that steady-state firm entry NE is higher in this second economy; note that
the reduction in the sunk entry cost is only a small fraction of the total change we consider
to match the range of NFD in the data). The shocks and parameter values other than ψe
are the same across economies. In turn, Figure 4 plots the response to a positive aggregate
productivity shock for the same two economies.
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Figure 3: Response to Positive Housing-Finance Shock (Quarters After Shock)
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Figure 4: Response to Positive Aggregate Productivity Shock (Quarters After Shock)
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First, note that amid aggregate productivity shocks, an economy with a lower ψe—and
therefore an economy with higher average new firm entry—exhibits smoother responses to
these shocks. Thus, aggregate productivity shocks alone cannot rationalize the empirical
link between NFD and house price volatility. In contrast, the response to housing-finance
shocks confirms the intuition and channels described above.
Specifically, in response to a positive housing-finance shock, output, labor, and firm
entry all rise, while consumption and physical investment fall (with a lag) as resources are
reallocated away from consumption and into the purchase of housing and the creation of
firms. Of particular importance for our purposes is the fact that, for a given set of shocks,
housing prices become more responsive in the economy with a lower ψe. As discussed above
and as shown in Figure 4, this is driven by both an initial larger response in borrowing rates
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amid housing-finance shocks as well as larger fluctuations in individual-firm profits (recall
that the reduction in ψe in Figures 3 and 4 is small relative to the range of ψe we consider in
Figure 1. Thus, the differential response in borrowing rates and firm profits relative to the
baseline (low NFD) calibration are bound to be larger the lower ψe (and hence the higher
NFD) is). Moreover, note that while the responsiveness of both output and housing prices
increases, the response of house prices is greater than that of output, ultimately resulting
in greater variability of house prices (relative to the variability of output) compared to an
economy with lower average firm entry.
4.4 The Role of Housing-Finance Shocks
To stress the role of housing-finance (or LTV) shocks in generating a non-negligible increase
in house price volatility as a result of greater average firm entry, we perform the same
experiments shown in Figure 1 for two variants of the benchmark model. First, a model
without housing finance constraints (and therefore without housing-finance shocks) (Figure
5 below). Second, a version of the benchmark model without housing-finance shocks (Figure
6 below). Of note, we introduce housing preference shocks in both alternative frameworks so
that, consistent with the calibration of the benchmark model, these two other models can
also replicate the same intercept in a model-based regression of relative house price volatility
on steady-state firm entry.29
29Otherwise, absent housing market shocks (either preference or housing-finance shocks), the model with
only aggregate productivity shocks generates too little volatility in house prices, both in absolute and relative
terms (see Figure A2 in the Appendix). Thus, for the purposes of comparability, we introduce housing
preference shocks. Section A.7 in the Appendix presents the calibration details for the housing preference
shocks for the two alternatives in Figures 5 and 6. For completeness, Figure A3 in the Appendix also shows
that introducing housing preference shocks alongside housing-finance and aggregate productivity shocks in
our benchmark framework does not change any of our conclusions. This is not surprising given that, per
Figure 1, housing-finance shocks can already generate the empirical link between NFD and house price
volatility well.
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Figure 5: New Firm Density and Housing Price Volatility: Data vs. Model without Housing
Finance Constraints
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Figure 6: New Firm Density and Housing Price Volatility: Data vs. Benchmark Model
without Housing Finance Shocks
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Absent housing finance constraints (and therefore housing-finance shocks), the model gen-
erates a positive qualitative relationship between new firm density and the relative volatility
of house prices. However, even amid housing preference shocks, a model without housing
finance constraints faces severe limitations in quantitatively matching the changes in volatil-
ity. This suggests that housing finance constraints play an important role in explaining the
facts in Section 2, mainly because these constraints allow for housing-finance shocks to affect
house prices via the mechanisms described above.
A similar claim holds in a version of the benchmark model where housing preference
shocks replace housing-finance shocks. The model does generate a positive relationship
between new firm density and the relative volatility of house prices, but the model still falls
short of fully capturing the quantitative change in house price volatility as new firm entry
changes. Intuitively, while housing preference shocks do increase the volatility of borrowing
rates and lending spreads, the quantitative change in volatility is not as strong as the one
from housing-finance shocks since these shocks have a more direct effect on the cost of credit
by affecting housing loans directly. All told, these experiments suggest that housing-finance
shocks play a key role in quantitatively explaining the link between NFD and house price
volatility in the data. Importantly, as we discuss briefly below, it is domestic housing-finance
shocks and not more general financial shocks—including, for example, foreign interest rate
shocks that embody global liquidity movements—that play a key role in explaining the
NFD-house price volatility nexus in the data.
To summarize the main mechanism and the importance of housing-finance shocks graph-
ically, Figure 7 plots average new firm entry against (1) the volatility of e households’ loans;
(2) the volatility of lending-deposit spreads; and (4) the relative volatility of house prices
for both the benchmark model and a version of the model with housing preference shocks
but no housing-finance shocks. We note that the volatility of lending spreads is completely
driven by the volatility of borrowing rates; therefore, we do not plot the latter.30 In the
absence of housing-finance shocks, the increase in the volatility of both housing loans and
30As noted earlier, for comparability, we consider a model with housing preference shocks so that both
models have the same initial relative volatility of house prices (i.e. the same relative volatility of house prices
for the lowest steady-state NE . Absent both housing preference and housing-finance shocks, the volatility
of house prices would be too low compared to the benchmark model.
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borrowing rates due to greater average firm entry is smaller, which ultimately results in a
smaller increase in the relative volatility of house prices.
Figure 7: New Firm Density, Housing-Loan and Lending-Spread Volatility, and Relative
Housing Price Volatility
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4.5 Empirical Validation of Model’s Main Mechanism
As noted earlier, greater average new firm entry generates an equilibrium increase in average
house prices. By increasing the average size of housing loans, greater average new firm entry
makes housing loans (and therefore bank credit), borrowing rates, and lending spreads more
sensitive to shocks—in particular, to housing-finance shocks. This greater volatility in bank
credit and lending spreads ultimately leads to higher house price volatility. If this mechanism
is indeed operative in the data, we should observe that greater average NFD is associated
with greater bank-credit volatility, and that bank-credit volatility is positively associated
with volatility in lending spreads in the data.
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Figure 8: New Firm Density, Average House Prices, and Credit Market Volatility: Evidence
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Sources: World Bank Entrepreneurship Survey (NFD), World Bank Bank for International Settlements
(house prices), IMF International Financial Statistics (bank credit), World Bank World Development Indi-
cators (lending spread). Notes: Bank credit is given by real domestic claims on private sector by depository
corporations. Similar facts hold with data for other depository corporations and with data at a quarterly
frequency. Lending spreads are given by the difference between lending and deposit rates. The volatility
measures for bank credit and lending spreads are computed based on filtered data using an HP filter with
smoothing parameter 100. See the Appendix for more details regarding data sources and coverage for each
variable. *** and ** denote significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.
Figure 8 plots average NFD in the data against the volatility of bank credit, and the
volatility of bank credit against the volatility of lending spreads.31 For completeness, the
31Data on bank credit that is closest to our model counterpart (that is, bank credit from depository
institutions) is available at a quarterly frequency for 42 economies in our sample (after eliminating outliers).
Uninterrupted series on lending spreads are available only at an annual frequency and for 23 economies in
our sample. In turn, only 20 of those economies coincide with the economies that have data on our measure
of bank credit. However, as shown in two upper subpanels in Figure 8, the positive relationship between
average NFD and the volatility of bank credit continues to hold using both quarterly and annual data for the
full sample of economies with available bank credit data. A similar claim applies if we restrict our sample
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upper subpanels of Figure 8 plot the volatility of bank credit at both quarterly and annual
frequencies against average NFD for the sample of economies in our sample that have avail-
able data. In turn, the lower subpanels of Figure 8 plot the volatility of bank credit (at an
annual frequency) against the volatility of lending spreads (also at an annual frequency) for
the economies in our sample that have available data on both measures (hence the smaller
number of observations for bank-credit volatility). All told, this evidence suggests that the
main mechanism in our model is supported by the data, which gives further validation to
our framework.
4.6 Heterogeneity in Housing Finance and Foreign Financial Shocks
The benchmark model assumes that s households do not borrow to purchase new housing;
that bank credit is only directed towards household credit; and that the only shocks driving
business cycles are aggregate productivity and housing-finance (or LTV) shocks.
Section A.5 of the Appendix presents the details of a richer version of the benchmark
model where, in addition to having e households face housing finance constraints, these same
households also borrow to cover a fraction of final goods firms’ sunk entry costs and a fraction
of intermediate goods firms’ wage and capital bills. Similarly, Section A.6 of the Appendix
presents the details of a version of the benchmark model where both e and s households face
housing finance constraints (and housing-finance shocks).32 Figure A4 in the Appendix shows
that our results remain unchanged when, in addition to the value of new housing, final goods
to 2006-2016. We note that the same strong, positive link between average NFD and relative house price
volatility continues to hold in the smaller country samples in Figure 8.
32Note that our model can accommodate this scenario without having to introduce an additional household
category that only saves (a modification that would increase the model’s complexity substantially). This
stands in contrast with existing models of housing amid financing constraints that assume household hetero-
geneity rooted in differences in subjective discount factors. The reason we can seamlessly introduce housing
finance for both households is simple: the presence of a monopolistically-competitive banking sector guaran-
tees a lending-deposit rate spread in steady state without requiring heterogeneity in households’ subjective
discount factors. In turn, having housing finance constraints across both households allows housing-finance
shocks—which, as noted earlier, play a key role in matching the facts in Section 2—to further affect house
price volatility (see Section A.6 for more details). Importantly, the fact that s households may hold de-
posit accounts (i.e., save) and also have housing loans is completely consistent with cross-country data on
financial account ownership and mortgage finance usage. Indeed, cross-country data from the World Bank
Financial Inclusion Database shows that the share of individuals with financial accounts (as a share of the
population ages +15) is greater than the share of individuals that have a loan to purchase a home (as a
share of the population ages +15). This immediately suggests that an individual with a housing loan will,
in all likelihood, also have a deposit account.
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firms’ sunk entry costs and intermediate-goods firms’ wage and capital bills are part of e
households’ financing constraints. In turn, Figure A5 shows that assuming that all household
categories have housing financing constraints generates a stronger relationship between NFD
and the volatility of house prices. This result is a natural reflection of the amplification
mechanism in the baseline model, which becomes stronger with more households facing
housing-finance shocks. We note, though, that data on the share of individuals with a loan
to purchase a home confirms that only a fraction of individuals across economies have housing
loans. Thus, the case in Figure A5 should be seen as an upper bound for the model-based link
between NFD and house price volatility. All told, the results in Figures A4 and A5 confirm
that the strength of the model mechanism reflected in Figure 1 is robust to alternative shock
specifications and richer specifications of e and s households’ financing constraints.
Finally, recent work has shown that international credit supply shocks play a relevant
role by affecting asset prices, including housing (Cesa-Bianchi, Cespedes, and Rebucci, 2015;
Cesa-Bianchi, Ferrero, and Rebucci, 2016, 2017). Figure A6 in the Appendix shows that
including foreign interest rate shocks does not affect the model’s success in quantitatively
explaining our new stylized fact. In fact, greater average firm entry tends to limit the impact
of foreign interest rate shocks by generating a more subdued response in macro aggregates
and house prices, as shown in Figure A7 in the Appendix. In other words, greater average
firm entry lessens the impact of external financial shocks on house price dynamics. These
results suggest that housing-market (financial) shocks specifically are critical for generating
the cross-country relationship between average NFD and house price volatility. In other
words, not all financial shocks are created equal when it comes to their impact on house
price volatility.
5 Conclusion
Using a large sample of countries with available high-frequency data on housing prices, we
show that in economies with greater average new firm density (NFD), house price volatility
is greater as well, even after controlling for other factors that may influence housing price
dynamics. This relationship is quantitatively important: our benchmark results suggest that
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a 1 percent increase in average new firm density can be associated with up to a roughly 0.6
percent increase in the average relative volatility of house prices. We build a small open
economy real business cycle model with endogenous firm entry and housing with housing
finance constraints to explore the economic mechanisms through which the NFD-house price
volatility nexus may arise.
Our framework can successfully replicate the average increase in the relative volatility of
housing prices as new firm density increases, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Greater
average new firm entry bolsters household income and leads to higher average house prices.
Higher average house prices imply larger average housing loans, making households’ choices
over loans more sensitive to housing-finance shocks. The greater sensitivity of housing loans
feeds into borrowing rates—a component of households’ cost of house purchases—and lending
spreads, which in turn become more sensitive to these shocks as well. The responsiveness
of borrowing rates and lending spreads to housing-finance shocks ultimately leads to greater
house price volatility amid greater average new firm entry. We find that this mechanism is
broadly supported by the data.
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A Online Appendix
A.1 Data Sources and Details
Our country sample is based on data availability on house prices by the Bank of International
Settlements (BIS) and new business density by the World Bank Entrepreneurship Report
and is comprised of: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Croatia,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong,
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, and United
Kingdom (Canada only has observations for 2015 and 2016 and as such is excluded from the
sample). Time coverage varies by country.
Loan for Home Purchase Share of population ages 15+ with a loan for home purchase
in 2011 (data availability restricted to 2011 and 2014). Source: World Bank Global Financial
Inclusion Database.
New Business Density New business entry density is given by the number of newly reg-
istered private corporations per 1000 individuals ages 15-64, available at a yearly frequency
from 2006 to 2016 (sample period varies by country). Source: World Bank Entrepreneur-
ship Survey. See http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/entrepreneurship and
http://econ.worldbank.org/research/entrepreneurship.
Bank Credit to the Private Sector as a share of GDP Available at yearly frequency
from 1990 to 2016 (sample period varies by country). Source: World Bank World Develop-
ment Indicators.
Lending-Deposit Interest Rate Spreads Available at yearly frequency from 1990 to
2016 (sample period varies by country). Source: World Bank World Development Indicators.
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Quarterly Real GDP Real Index, available at quarterly frequency from 1990Q1 to
2016Q4 (sample period varies by country). Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
All data is seasonally adjusted using the Census X12 method.
Quarterly Real Investment Available at a quarterly frequency from 1990Q1 to 2016Q4
(sample period varies by country). Source: IMF International Financial Statistics. All data
is seasonally adjusted.
Quarterly Inflation Rate Growth rate of consumer price index (CPI), available at quar-
terly frequency from 1990Q1 to 2016Q4 (sample period varies by country). Source: IMF
International Financial Statistics.
Real House Prices (BIS) Real property prices from the Bank for International Settle-
ments (BIS) are available at a quarterly frequency from 1990Q1 to 2016Q4 (sample period
varies by country). All data is seasonally adjusted using the Census X12 method.
Real House Prices (Cesa-Bianchi, Cespedes, and Rebucci, 2015) Real property
prices from Cesa-Bianchi, Cespedes, and Rebucci (2015) are available at quarterly frequency
from 1990Q1 to 2012Q4 for: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong,
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom (sample period varies by
country).
Global Liquidity from Banks Global Liquidity Indicators: cross-border total claims by
domestic, foreign, consortium, and unclassified banks/financial institutions for all reporting
countries and all sectors, available at quarterly frequency from 1990Q1 to 2016Q4. Source:
Bank for International Settlements.
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Household Credit Share Average household credit as a share of total (household and
firm) credit, 1994-2005. Source: Beck, Bu¨yu¨kkarabacak, Rioja, and Valev (2012). Coun-
tries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Latvia,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Rus-
sia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, and
United Kingdom.
Own Account Worker Share Share of own account workers in total employment, yearly
average from 2000 to 2016. Source: International Labour Organization.
Informal Sector Size Average informal sector size as a percent of GDP, yearly average
from 1999 to 2007 (only years available). Source: Schneider (2012).
Bank Credit Domestic Claims on Private Sector by Depository Corporations (Depository
Corporations Survey, Domestic Claims, Claims on Other Sectors, Claims on Private Sector
(refers to the Depository Corporations), Domestic Currency, Nominal). Available at quar-
terly frequency from 2001Q4 to 2016Q4 (uninterrupted coverage varies by country). Data is
seasonally adjusted using the Census X12 method. Real bank credit is obtained using each
country’s CPI. Annual series are computed as quarterly averages. Countries: Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Es-
tonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands,
Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Thailand, and Turkey. Source: International Monetary Fund International
Financial Statistics.
Lending Spread Difference between lending and deposit rate (percent). Available at an-
nual frequency from 1990 to 2016 (uninterrupted coverage varies by country). Countries:
Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nether-
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lands, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Switzer-
land, and Thailand. Source: World Bank Development Indicators.
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A.2 Robustness Checks: New Firm Formation and Housing Price
Volatility Across Countries
Table A1: Relative Volatility of House Prices and New Firm Density (1990Q1-2016Q4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ave. New Firm Density 0.0812∗∗ 0.0911∗∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.110∗∗ 0.114∗∗ 0.110∗∗ 0.173∗∗
(2.75) (2.81) (3.30) (3.04) (3.14) (3.05) (3.35)
Loan to Purchase Home -0.00849 0.00591 0.0128 0.0185 0.0300 -0.0150
(-0.66) (0.39) (0.82) (1.10) (1.64) (-0.59)
Bank Credit-GDP Ratio -0.0105 -0.00691 -0.00905 -0.00713 -0.000639
(-1.64) (-1.04) (-1.29) (-1.01) (-0.07)
Inflation Rate 0.0887 0.0878 0.0772 0.106
(1.63) (1.61) (1.42) (1.12)
Corr(Gl. Liquidity,GDP) -0.718 -0.257 -0.134
(-0.97) (-0.32) (-0.15)
Advanced Econ. -0.709
(-1.47)
Household Credit Share 2.594
(1.65)
Constant 1.873∗∗∗ 1.991∗∗∗ 2.380∗∗∗ 1.832∗∗∗ 2.223∗∗ 2.156∗∗ 0.560
(8.43) (7.42) (6.72) (3.78) (3.52) (3.45) (0.52)
Adjusted R2 0.111 0.107 0.137 0.167 0.165 0.186 0.294
Observations 54 51 51 51 51 51 34
t statistics in parentheses
+p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
Sources: World Bank Global Financial Inclusion Database, World Bank Doing Business, World Bank World
Development Indicators, IMF International Financial Statistics, Bank of International Settlements. Notes:
The relative volatility of house prices for a given country is computed as the volatility of HP-filtered real
house prices divided by the volatility of HP-filtered real GDP for that country, using a smoothing parameter
of 1600. The cyclical correlation between global liquidity supplied by banks and real GDP is computed as
the contemporaneous correlation of HP-filtered global liquidity supplied by banks and HP-filtered real GDP,
using a smoothing parameter of 1600. See the Data Appendix for details regarding data sources, country
sample, and definitions.
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Table A2: Relative Volatility of House Prices and New Firm Density (2006Q1-2016Q4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ave. New Firm Density 0.0664∗ 0.0677∗ 0.0908∗ 0.0838∗ 0.0853∗ 0.0833∗ 0.194∗∗∗
(2.32) (2.14) (2.35) (2.18) (2.16) (2.10) (3.71)
Loan to Purchase Home -0.000422 0.0102 0.0177 0.0188 0.0254 -0.0233
(-0.03) (0.63) (1.05) (1.06) (1.32) (-0.92)
Bank Credit-GDP Ratio -0.00612 -0.00412 -0.00444 -0.00393 0.00308
(-1.04) (-0.69) (-0.71) (-0.62) (0.40)
Inflation Rate 0.612 0.600 0.415 0.417
(1.44) (1.39) (0.87) (0.91)
Corr(Gl. Liquidity,GDP) -0.162 0.108 0.533
(-0.21) (0.13) (0.52)
Advanced Econ. -0.500
(-0.94)
Household Credit Share 2.106
(1.33)
Constant 1.836∗∗∗ 1.859∗∗∗ 2.103∗∗∗ 1.429∗ 1.531+ 1.672∗ -0.0192
(8.55) (7.10) (5.98) (2.45) (1.98) (2.12) (-0.02)
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.060 0.061 0.083 0.063 0.060 0.315
Observations 53 50 50 50 50 50 33
t statistics in parentheses
+p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
Sources: World Bank Global Financial Inclusion Database, World Bank Doing Business, World Bank World
Development Indicators, IMF International Financial Statistics, Bank of International Settlements. Notes:
The relative volatility of house prices for a given country is computed as the volatility of HP-filtered real
house prices divided by the volatility of HP-filtered real GDP for that country, using a smoothing parameter
of 1600. The cyclical correlation between global liquidity supplied by banks and real GDP is computed as
the contemporaneous correlation of HP-filtered global liquidity supplied by banks and HP-filtered real GDP,
using a smoothing parameter of 1600. See the Data Appendix for details regarding data sources, country
sample, and definitions.
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Table A3: Relative Volatility of House Prices and New Firm Density, New Firm Density 2006
(2000Q1-2016Q4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
New Firm Density 2006 0.106∗∗ 0.127∗∗ 0.154∗∗ 0.142∗∗ 0.148∗∗ 0.150∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗
(3.02) (3.17) (3.25) (2.96) (3.24) (3.26) (4.35)
Loan to Purchase Home -0.0109 0.00277 0.00771 0.0228 0.0296 -0.0408
(-0.68) (0.13) (0.37) (1.09) (1.29) (-1.22)
Bank Credit-GDP Ratio -0.00811 -0.00481 -0.0101 -0.00996 -0.00465
(-1.05) (-0.59) (-1.26) (-1.23) (-0.44)
Inflation Rate 0.457 0.187 0.109 -0.0823
(1.20) (0.49) (0.28) (-0.19)
Corr(Gl. Liquidity,GDP) -2.117∗ -1.898∗ -2.109+
(-2.40) (-2.02) (-1.83)
Advanced Econ. -0.434
(-0.71)
Household Credit Share 4.355∗
(2.24)
Constant 1.819∗∗∗ 1.948∗∗∗ 2.256∗∗∗ 1.600∗ 3.023∗∗ 3.114∗∗ 1.819
(6.87) (5.92) (5.13) (2.28) (3.39) (3.44) (1.31)
Adjusted R2 0.137 0.146 0.148 0.157 0.239 0.230 0.443
Observations 52 49 49 49 49 49 33
t statistics in parentheses
+p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
Sources: World Bank Global Financial Inclusion Database, World Bank Doing Business, World Bank World
Development Indicators, IMF International Financial Statistics, Bank of International Settlements. Notes:
The relative volatility of house prices for a given country is computed as the volatility of HP-filtered real
house prices divided by the volatility of HP-filtered real GDP for that country, using a smoothing parameter
of 1600. The cyclical correlation between global liquidity supplied by banks and real GDP is computed as
the contemporaneous correlation of HP-filtered global liquidity supplied by banks and HP-filtered real GDP,
using a smoothing parameter of 1600. See the Data Appendix for details regarding data sources, country
sample, and definitions.
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Table A4: Relative Volatility of House Prices and New Firm Density, Alternative Specifications
(2000Q1-2016Q4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ave. New Firm Density 0.132∗∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.122∗ 0.135∗∗ 0.129∗
(2.93) (3.08) (2.53) (2.92) (2.65)
Loan to Purchase Home 0.0241 0.0307 0.0175 0.0252 0.0258
(1.13) (1.48) (0.76) (1.05) (1.07)
Bank Credit-GDP Ratio -0.00965 -0.00666 -0.00840 -0.00692
(-1.26) (-0.80) (-1.00) (-0.84)
Inflation Volatility 0.670∗ 0.638+
(2.07) (2.00)
Corr(Gl. Liquidity,GDP) -2.115∗ -1.360 -2.033∗ -2.063∗ -2.456∗
(-2.47) (-1.59) (-2.18) (-2.26) (-2.42)
ave log gdppc ppp 2000 2016 -0.859+
(-1.80)
Inflation Rate 0.554 0.282 0.516
(1.67) (0.72) (1.55)
Own-Account-Worker Share -0.0114 -0.00109
(-0.53) (-0.05)
Informal Sector Size 0.00929
(0.37)
Pop. Growth -0.333
(-1.07)
Constant 2.784∗∗∗ 10.25∗ 2.804∗ 2.545∗ 2.945∗∗
(3.98) (2.30) (2.62) (2.04) (2.73)
Adjusted R2 0.229 0.256 0.193 0.169 0.195
Observations 51 51 51 50 51
t statistics in parentheses
+p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
Sources: World Bank Global Financial Inclusion Database, World Bank Doing Business, World Bank World
Development Indicators, IMF International Financial Statistics, Bank of International Settlements. Notes:
The relative volatility of house prices for a given country is computed as the volatility of HP-filtered real
house prices divided by the volatility of HP-filtered real GDP for that country, using a smoothing parameter
of 1600. The cyclical correlation between global liquidity supplied by banks and real GDP is computed as
the contemporaneous correlation of HP-filtered global liquidity supplied by banks and HP-filtered real GDP,
using a smoothing parameter of 1600. See the Data Appendix for details regarding data sources, country
sample, and definitions.
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Table A5: Relative Volatility of House Prices and New Firm Density, Data in First Differences
(2000Q1-2016Q4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ave. New Firm Density 0.0578∗ 0.0695∗∗ 0.0825∗∗ 0.0800∗∗ 0.0902∗∗ 0.0912∗∗ 0.147∗∗
(2.45) (2.76) (2.79) (2.70) (3.02) (3.05) (3.63)
Loan to Purchase Home -0.00704 0.000253 0.00302 0.00301 0.0102 -0.0122
(-0.71) (0.02) (0.22) (0.23) (0.67) (-0.61)
Bank Credit-GDP Ratio -0.00416 -0.00275 -0.00366 -0.00384 0.00186
(-0.85) (-0.54) (-0.73) (-0.76) (0.31)
Inflation Rate 0.209 0.293 0.232 0.359
(1.01) (1.40) (1.06) (1.38)
Corr(Gl. Liquidity,GDP) 1.045 1.201+ 1.544∗
(1.62) (1.80) (2.08)
Advanced Econ. -0.364
(-0.94)
Household Credit Share 0.942
(0.77)
Constant 1.688∗∗∗ 1.793∗∗∗ 1.941∗∗∗ 1.620∗∗∗ 1.307∗∗ 1.433∗∗ 0.261
(9.49) (8.60) (7.12) (3.88) (2.87) (3.02) (0.37)
Adjusted R2 0.086 0.102 0.096 0.097 0.127 0.125 0.253
Observations 54 51 51 51 51 51 34
t statistics in parentheses
+p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
Sources: World Bank Global Financial Inclusion Database, World Bank Doing Business, World Bank World
Development Indicators, IMF International Financial Statistics, Bank of International Settlements. Notes:
The relative volatility of house prices is computed as the volatility of real house prices in first differences
divided by the volatility of real GDP in first differences. The cyclical correlation between global liquidity
supplied by banks and real GDP is computed as the contemporaneous correlation of global liquidity supplied
by banks in first differences and real GDP in first differences. See the Data Appendix for details regarding
data sources, country sample, and definitions.
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Table A6: Relative Volatility of House Prices and New Firm Density, Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2015) House
Price Data (2000Q1-2012Q4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ave. New Firm Density 0.0628 0.0913+ 0.119∗ 0.112∗ 0.110∗ 0.108∗ 0.202∗
(1.43) (1.94) (2.38) (2.32) (2.26) (2.20) (2.49)
Loan to Purchase Home -0.0291+ -0.00598 0.000304 -0.00322 0.00726 -0.0502
(-1.72) (-0.26) (0.01) (-0.14) (0.28) (-1.25)
Bank Credit-GDP Ratio -0.0128 -0.00777 -0.00631 -0.00587 -0.00489
(-1.49) (-0.90) (-0.70) (-0.65) (-0.38)
Inflation Rate 0.677+ 0.696∗ 0.615+ 0.258
(2.00) (2.03) (1.73) (0.33)
Corr(Gl. Liquidity,GDP) 0.702 1.011 0.790
(0.66) (0.90) (0.51)
Advanced Econ. -0.582
(-0.92)
Household Credit Share 3.322
(1.38)
Constant 2.265∗∗∗ 2.633∗∗∗ 3.120∗∗∗ 2.051∗∗ 1.621 1.707+ 1.023
(7.28) (7.18) (6.40) (2.88) (1.67) (1.75) (0.50)
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.063 0.088 0.148 0.136 0.133 0.129
Observations 50 47 47 47 47 47 32
t statistics in parentheses
+p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
Sources: World Bank Global Financial Inclusion Database, World Bank Doing Business, World Bank World
Development Indicators, IMF International Financial Statistics, Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2015). Notes: The
relative volatility of house prices for a given country is computed as the volatility of HP-filtered real house
prices divided by the volatility of HP-filtered real GDP for that country, using a smoothing parameter of
1600. The cyclical correlation between global liquidity supplied by banks and real GDP is computed as the
contemporaneous correlation of HP-filtered global liquidity supplied by banks and HP-filtered real GDP,
using a smoothing parameter of 1600. See the Data Appendix for details regarding data sources, country
sample, and definitions.
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A.3 Entry Costs and New Business Density Across Countries
Figure A1: Cost of Starting a Business and New Business Density
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Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys. The average cost of starting a business for a given year is the
average of such cost for men and women in that year. All variables above are time averages for the period
2006-2016 (a limited number of countries does not have observations for all years). Malta is the only country
in our country sample that does not have data on the cost of starting a business. *** denotes significance
at the 1 percent level.
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A.4 Equilibrium Conditions: Benchmark Model
Taking the sequence of shocks as given, the allocations and prices {ρt, N t, NE,t, vt, rk,t} and
{wt, cs,t, ns,t, hs,t, Rt, le,t, kt, b
∗
t , Rh,t, ne,t, Qt, dt, nt, yt, he,t, it, Yt, ce,t} satisfy
ρt = (ε/(ε− 1))mct, (23)
Nt = (1− δ) (Nt−1 +NE,t−1) , (24)
vt =
ψe
(1− δ)
, (25)
vt = EtΞ
e
t+1|t

[ρt+1 −mct+1] yt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
pie,t+1
+ (1− δ) vt+1

 , (26)
rk,t = αmctztn
1−α
t k
α−1
t , (27)
wt = (1− α)mctztn
−α
t k
α
t , (28)
cs,t +Qh,t(hs,t − hs,t−1) + dt = wtns,t +Rt−1dt−1, (29)
κnξs,t = wt, (30)
Qh,t =
(hs,t)
−σh
ucs,t
+ EtΞ
s
t+1|tQh,t+1, (31)
ucs,t = βRtEtucs,t+1, (32)
le,t = φh,tQh,the,t, (33)
1 = EtΞ
e
t+1|t [rk,t+1 + 1− δ] , (34)
1 = R∗tEtΞ
e
t+1|t + ηbb
∗
t , (35)
Re,t =
(
εh
εh − 1
)
Rt, (36)
κnξe,t = wt, (37)
Qh,t =
(he,t)
−σh
uce,t
+ EtΞ
e
t+1|tQh,t+1 −Qh,tφh,t
[
EtΞ
e
t+1|tRe,t − 1
]
, (38)
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dt = le,t, (39)
ne,t + ns,t = nt, (40)
ztn
1−α
t k
α
t = Ntyt, (41)
he,t + hs,t = 1, (42)
it = kt − (1− δ)kt−1, (43)
Yt = ytN
ε
ε−1
t , (44)
Yt = cs,t + ce,t + it + ψeNE,t +R
∗
t−1b
∗
t−1 − b
∗
t , (45)
where Ξst+1|t ≡ βucs,t+1/ucs,t and Ξ
e
t+1|t ≡ βuce,t+1/uce,t.
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A.5 Richer Specification of Financing Constraints
Recall that entrepreneur (e) households own all firms. For simplicity and in order to make
the model as simple as possible, we assume that entrepreneur (e) households not only supply
labor to intermediate-goods firms, but also act as demanders of labor from the vantage point
of their intermediate-goods firms. This allows us to have a single financing constraint where
the firms’ wage and capital bills and the sunk entry costs are present. Put differently, in
this modified environment, we can think of e households as supplying labor to intermediate-
goods other than their own, and demanding labor for their intermediate-goods firms from
households other than their own.
Entrepreneur (e) Households Entrepreneur (e) households choose consumption ce,t,
housing demand he,t, labor supply ne,t, labor demand nt, capital accumulation kt, total
borrowed funds le,t, foreign debt holdings b
∗
t , the number of new firms NE,t, and the desired
number of future firms Nt+1 to maximize
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ce,t, ne,t, he,t)
subject to the budget constraint33
ce,t + ψeNE,t +Qh,t(he,t − he,t−1) +Re,t−1le,t−1 +R
∗
t−1b
∗
t−1 +
ηb
2
(b∗t )
2
= wtne,t + b
∗
t +Ntpie,t +
[
mctztn
1−α
t k
α
t−1 − wtnt − (kt − (1− δ)kt−1)
]
+ le,t,
the evolution of final goods firms
Nt+1 = (1− δ) (Nt +NE,t) , (46)
and the financing constraint
le,t = φh,tQh,the,t + φeψeNE,t + φnwtnt + φkrk,tkt. (47)
33We include standard capital adjustment costs as part of our quantitative analysis.
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where intermediate-goods-firms profits Πi,t =
[
mctztn
1−α
t k
α
t−1 − wtnt − (kt − (1− δ)kt−1)
]
,
(kt − (1− δ)kt−1) denotes physical capital investment, mct is the price of intermediate goods,
z is exogenous aggregate productivity, and 0 < α < 1. Preferences continue to be of the GHH
form over consumption and labor: u(ce,t, ne,t, he,t) =
[
1
1−σ
(
ce,t −
κ
1+ξ
n1+ξe,t
)1−σ
+ γ
1−σh
(he,t)
1−σh
]
with σ, σh, κ, ξ, γ > 0. The financing constraint now specifies that total borrowed funds is a
fraction φh of new housing purchases, a fraction φe of the sunk entry costs, a fraction φn of
the wage bill, and a fraction φk of the capital bill, where 0 ≤ φe, φn, φk ≤ 1.
The Euler equations for capital and foreign debt, as well as optimal housing demand,
remain unchanged relative to those in the main text:
1 = EtΞ
e
t+1|t [rk,t+1 + 1− δ] , (48)
1 = R∗tEtΞ
e
t+1|t + ηbb
∗
t , (49)
and
Qh,t =
(he,t)
−σh
uce,t
+ EtΞ
e
t+1|tQh,t+1 −Qh,tφh,t
[
EtΞ
e
t+1|tRe,t − 1
]
, (50)
where Ξet+1|t ≡ βeuce,t+1/uce,t is the household’s stochastic discount factor and we can define
rk,t ≡ αmctztn
1−α
t k
α−1
t−1 . Similarly, the labor supply condition is still
κnξe,t = wt. (51)
In contrast to the model in the main text, labor and capital demand are now given by
wt
[
1− φn + φnEtΞ
e
t+1|tRe,t
]
= (1− α)mctztn
−α
t k
α
t−1, (52)
and
rk,t
[
1− φk + φkEtΞ
e
t+1|tRe,t
]
≡ αmctztn
1−α
t k
α−1
t−1 .
The optimal firm creation condition is
vt = EtΞ
e
t+1|t [pie,t+1 + (1− δ) vt+1] , (53)
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where vt denotes the value of creating a new firm and, and the entry condition is characterized
by
vt =
ψe
[
1− φe + φeEtΞ
e
t+1|tRe,t
]
(1− δ)
. (54)
The rest of the model remains the same relative to the one in the main text.
A.6 Model where All Households Borrow
In what follows, we discuss the modifications of the benchmark model that allows for both
households to borrow to finance new housing purchases. The problems for e households and
firms remain unchanged relative to those described in the main text.
Saver (s) Households There is a continuum of identical saver (s) households over the
interval [0, 1]. They choose consumption cs,t, housing demand hs,t, bank deposits dt, their
own labor supply ns,t, and total borrowed funds ls,t to maximize
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(cs,t, ns,t, hs,t)
subject to the budget constraint
cs,t +Qh,t(hs,t − hs,t−1) + dt +Rs,t−1ls,t−1 = ls,t + wtns,t +Rt−1dt−1 +Πb,t, (55)
and the financing constraint
ls,t = φh,tQh,ths,t, (56)
where Qh,t is the real price of housing, Rs,t is the real gross lending rate, wt is the real
wage, Rt is the gross real interest rate on deposits, and Πb,t =
∫ 1
0
pijb,tdj denotes total bank
profits (defined below). Households have GHH preferences over consumption and labor:
u(cs,t, ns,t, hs,t) =
[
1
1−σ
(
cs,t −
κ
1+ξ
n1+ξs,t
)1−σ
+ γh
1−σh
(hs,t)
1−σh
]
with σ, σh, κ, ξ, γ > 0. Replac-
ing the financing constraint in the household’s budget constraint, the first-order conditions
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yield standard optimal labor supply and housing demand expressions:
κnξs,t = wt, (57)
and
Qh,t =
(hs,t)
−σh
ucs,t
+ EtΞ
s
t+1|tQh,t+1 −Qh,tφh,t
[
EtΞ
s
t+1|tRs,t − 1
]
, (58)
as well as a standard Euler equation over deposits
ucs,t = βRtEtucs,t+1, (59)
where Ξst+1|t ≡ βucs,t+1/ucs,t . Similar to e households in the main text, s households’ demand
for differentiated borrowed funds is given by ljs,t =
∫ 1
0
lijs,tdi =
∫ 1
0
(
Rjs,t
Rs,t
)−εh
lis,tdi.
Banks The banking sector has a measure [0, 1] of banks. Banks are monopolistically
competitive in the market for loans but perfectly competitive in the market for deposits.
They turn all their profits to s households. Each bank j chooses its gross real loan rate Rje,t
and Rjs,t to maximize profits pijb,t = Rje,tlje,t + Rjs,tljs,t − Rtdj,t − lje,t − ljs,t − djt subject
to the balance sheet constraint lje,t + ljs,t = djt and the bank’s loan demand condition from
e and s households. Note that we assume that loans for e and s households are perfect
substitutes. The optimal loan rate for bank j is a standard markup over the deposit rate
Rje,t = Rjs,t = (εh/(εh − 1))Rt.
A.7 Main Results Under Alternative Parameterizations
Benchmark Model without Housing Finance Constraints: Calibration Details
Absent housing finance constraints in the benchmark model, and in the presence of housing
preference shocks to match the intercept of a regression of relative house price volatility on
NFD in the data, the implied volatility of housing preference shocks is σzh = 0.211. Note
that the model-generated slope arises endogenously.
For completeness, Figure A2 below presents the results from the model without housing
finance constraints in the absence of housing preference shocks. As should be expected,
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absent these shocks, the relative volatility of house prices is lower than in the data, even
for low levels of NFD. Moreover, the model fails to match the positive relationship between
house price volatility and NFD.
Figure A2: New Firm Density and Housing Price Volatility: Data vs. Benchmark Model
without Housing Finance Constraints, No Housing Preference Shocks
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Benchmark Model with zh Shocks Figure A3 plots new firm density against the relative
volatility of housing prices as well as the implied trend line in the data and compares the
trend in the data to the predictions of a version of our benchmark model that includes
housing preference shocks alongside the other two shocks in the main text. In the model
calibration, we assume that the volatility of housing-finance (or LTV) and housing preference
shocks is the same. Consistent with our approach in the main text, we choose this volatility
such that we match the intercept of a regression of relative price volatility on average new
firm density (this yields σzh = σφh = 0.03). For completeness, we also show the results for
an alternative calibration where the persistence of housing preference shocks is higher than
the persistence of housing-based housing-finance shocks (ρzh = 0.95 instead of ρzh = 0.90).
Once again, recall that the model-generated slope arises endogenously and is not matched
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Figure A3: New Firm Density and Housing Price Volatility: Data vs. Benchmark Model
with zh Shocks
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
New Firm Density
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
R
el
. V
ol
. o
f H
ou
sin
g 
Pr
ice
s
Data
Data: Linear Trend
Model with zh Shocks: Linear Trend
Model with zh Shocks, Higher zh
by construction.
Benchmark Model with Sunk Entry Costs, the Wage Bill, and Investment in
e Households’ Financing Constraint Figure A4 plots new firm density against the
relative volatility of housing prices as well as the implied trend line in the data and compares
the trend in the data to the predictions of a version of our benchmark model where final goods
firms’ sunk entry costs and intermediate goods firms’ wage and capital bills are a component
of e households’ financing constraint (see Subsection A.6 above for the model details). For
illustrative purposes, we choose the share of sunk entry costs financed with bank credit
to be φe = 0.80. In turn, following Iacoviello (2015) and the literature on working capital
constraints, we set φn = φk = 1.
34 The implied volatility of housing-finance shocks so that
the trend line in the data and the trend line from the model have the same intercept is
σφh = 0.0628. Once again, recall that the model-generated slope arises endogenously and is
34Iacoviello (2015) does not assume that the capital bill is financed with credit. Our assumption is for
completeness, but our results do not depend on the inclusion of the capital bill in households’ financing
constraint. A similar comment applies to alternative values for φn and φk.
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not matched by construction.
Figure A4: New Firm Density and Housing Price Volatility: Data vs. Model with Sunk
Entry Costs, Wage Bill, and Capital Bill in Financing Constraint
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Benchmark Model where All Households Borrow Figure A5 plots new firm density
against the relative volatility of housing prices as well as the implied trend line in the data and
compares the trend in the data to the predictions of a version of our benchmark model where
both e and s households borrow to finance their new housing purchases. We set the volatility
of housing-finance shocks so that the trend line in the data and the trend line from the model
have the same intercept. This yields σφh = 0.0453. As Figure A6 shows, allowing for both
households to borrow leads to a stronger positive relationship between average new firm
density and relative housing price volatility. This result is consistent with the amplification
mechanism described in the model being greater the more households participate in housing
finance.
58
Figure A5: New Firm Density and Housing Price Volatility: Data vs. Model where All
Households Borrow
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Benchmark Model with Foreign Interest Rate Shocks Figure A6 plots new firm
density against the relative volatility of housing prices as well as the implied trend line in
the data and compares the trend in the data to the predictions of a version of our bench-
mark model that includes foreign interest rate shocks, which we consider as a proxy for
international credit supply shocks. We assume that R∗ follows an AR(1) process. We set the
autoregressive parameter ρR∗ = 0.76 and the volatility σR∗ = 0.0084. These values are consis-
tent with an estimated AR(1) process for U.S. real interest rates using the inflation-adjusted
3-month Treasury bill as our measure of U.S. rates for the period 2000Q1-2016Q4. We set
the volatility of housing-finance shocks so that the trend line in the data and the trend line
from the model have the same intercept. This yields σφh = 0.0335. Once again, recall that
the model-generated slope arises endogenously and is not matched by construction.
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Figure A6: New Firm Density and Housing Price Volatility: Data vs. Model with Foreign
Interest Rate Shocks
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Finally, Figure A7 shows the response of the economy to a temporary, exogenous increase
in foreign interest rates (the impulse responses for aggregate productivity and housing-finance
shocks look similar to those in Figures 2 and 3 in the main text).
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Figure A7: Response to Adverse Foreign Interest Rate Shock (Quarters After Shock), Model
with Foreign Interest Rate Shocks
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A.8 Average New Firm Density and Average House Prices: Evi-
dence
Figure A8: Average New Firm Density and House Prices
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Sources: (New Firm Density, NFD) and Bank for International Settlements (Real House Prices). Notes:
Figure based on annual data covering 2006 (the first year available for NFD) to 2016.
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